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This paper addresses the challenge of security sector reform (SSR) in 
democratizing Sudan. The former regime developed a sprawling, expensive, 
corrupt, brutal and ineffective array of military forces, paramilitaries, and 
security units. The popular uprising that overthrew this regime sought to bring 
democracy, end the long-running wars in Darfur and the “Two Areas” of Southern 
Kordofan and Blue Nile, revitalize the economy, end corruption, and reform and 
downsize the security sector. All these objectives have faced formidable 
obstacles. Security sector reform has scarcely made it to the political agenda. 
 
The peace process between the 
Government of Sudan and the armed 
groups in Darfur and the Two Areas, 
convened in Juba last October and 
proceeding towards possible 
successful conclusion in the coming 
weeks, presents an opportunity for 
moving the SSR agenda forward. 
 
This paper draws upon an analysis of 
the Sudanese security sector, the 
peace and democratization processes, 
and comparative analysis of the 
preconditions for successful SSR 
elsewhere in the world. The key 
findings are that democratic SSR 
requires a combination of a disruptive 
political transition and a strong pro-
reform coalition that spans civil 
society, political parties, and members 
of the security forces themselves. This 
demand factor is more important than 
technical blueprints for reform (supply 
factors). The paper argues that 
Sudan’s ongoing transition meets the 
first condition, and that there is a 
nascent pro-reform coalition that 
should be encouraged and supported.  
 
We argue that the current Juba peace 
talks should focus on setting over-
arching SSR objectives followed by 
creating inclusive and credible 
processes and mechanisms that will 
gather the input and information 
necessary to craft widely acceptable 
means to achieve these objectives. 
Pro-reform actors should prioritize 
building consultations around issues 
of security and justice into Sudan’s 
transition process, to ensure that the 
SSR agenda is sustained in a coherent 
and well-rooted manner. 
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Introduction  
The peace talks in Sudan are poised to 
reach a peace agreement in June. The 
long-awaited settlement between the 
Government of Sudan and armed rebels 
in Darfur, the “Two Areas” of Southern 
Kordofan and Blue Nile, promises to 
reinvigorate the transition to democracy 
that was launched with the non-violent 
overthrow of the former regime of 
President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. If 
the peace agreement brings an end to the 
fighting—and also sets in motion a reform 
of the country’s security sector—then 
democracy in Sudan might finally be 
possible.  
 
The previous regime kept itself afloat 
through a keen understanding and 
manipulation of Sudan’s status as a 
political marketplace. In this context,  a 
skilful manager (al-Bashir) could play 
different security force factions and 
peripheral armed groups against one 
another – thus affordably renting, at any 
given time, sufficient support to keep 
power.1 However, this system, particularly 
the corruption and use of a violence as a 
bargaining tactic that it encouraged, 
 
1 Alex de Waal. “Sudan: A Political Marketplace Framework 
Analysis,” Occasional Paper No. 19. Conflict Research 
inherently became more expensive and 
less stable over time. Eventually, 
domestic unrest and economic shocks 
to a rapidly decaying system were 
enough to shatter it.  
 
This legacy and changing external 
factors mean that no successor 
autocrat can reconstruct the previous 
ruling coalition along similar lines. 
Nothing like the vast and centralized 
financial resources al-Bashir once 
controlled are now available. Sudan’s 
oil revenue, already reduced and 
dependent on transit fees, has been 
further depleted by the sudden 
dramatic drop in worldwide oil prices - 
sparked by Covid-19, but likely to 
persist even after the crisis resolves. 
Gold is difficult to control and 
unpredictable in value and much of it 
disappears into secret accounts. Rents 
from mercenary activities depend on 
the existence of buyers both willing and 
able to purchase such services at any 
given time.  
 
Given this, the worst case scenario for 
virtually all Sudanese actors is that 
Sudan will revert to its modus operandi 
Programme/World Peace Foundation, August 2019. 
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of the mid- and late-1980s when state 
finances collapsed to the extent that the 
political marketplace became a predatory 
war economy, “based on mortgaging 
existing assets or selling equity in future 
power dispensations,” and thus 
dramatically more unstable and violent, 
with security actors paid by their patrons 
with licenses to raid and loot certain 
areas at will.2 Even the winners in such a 
system will net rapidly diminishing 
returns, and at great risk. In this 
devolution into a “security arena” violence 
will be fully decentralized among 
fragmented security actors with 
contending and at times contradicting 
interests and aligning those interests to 
restore peace will likely happen only after 
painful losses on all sides. 
 
The best alternative for most actors is the 
construction of a new ruling coalition, 
wherein various interest groups 
collaborate to transform Sudan into a 
much more attractive environment for the 
domestic private sector, external 
investment, and development projects 
that maximize the country’s neglected 
non-mineral resources, particularly 
agriculture and trade. The success of this 
transformation in turn depends heavily on 
 
2 Alex de Waal. “Framing Paper: The Political Marketplace 
the success of security and justice 
reform. This is not universally true – 
states such as Ghana and Senegal 
have managed to become reasonably 
democratic with only moderate 
changes to their security systems. 
However, as this piece explores, in 
Sudan, security force disfunction is 
inextricable linked with the political 
disfunction, pervasive private and 
public sector corruption, and the 
unpredictable legal environment that 
has fostered conflict and stunted 
prosperity in Sudan for decades. A new 
regime that looks to secure the loyalty 
of citizens by meeting demands for 
jobs, healthcare, justice, and safety will 
first face the difficult task of unraveling 
these ties.  
 
The building blocks for a successful 
pro-reform coalition exist.  Factions 
within the security services recognize 
the need for, and potential benefits of, 
reform. Businesspeople and the 
educated labor force that make up 
urban civil society – the main 
constituencies of the Forces for 
Freedom and Change Alliance (FFC) - 
are as united as they have been in 
Framework,” 11 
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decades.  Communities and armed 
groups in Sudan’s peripheries are, if 
understandably wary, at least open to 
new bargains.  
 
However, this coalition will not form, 
survive, or maintain the political 
momentum to achieve difficult but 
essential reform goals automatically. 
Right now, it shows signs of 
disintegrating before it can truly cohere, 
due to pervasive (though understandable) 
distrust between different interest groups 
and disunity within them. The FFC is not 
strong or internally united enough to 
govern alone. The armed groups with 
which it might naturally ally cannot 
commit to such an alliance without time-
consuming internal negotiations and 
extensive guarantees.  
 
The security forces with whom the FFC 
has allied to form the current transitional 
government are also divided. Some 
understand security reform as critical to a 
stable future for the country, but many 
act to marginalize civilians in the hope 
that, if they stall long enough to make real 
reform seem an empty promise, they can 
hold onto past power and privileges. This 
later group is making an extremely risky 
bet that new sources of political finance – 
the basis for a new kleptocracy - will 
emerge before real reform can take 
root. Whether or not such sources 
emerge, the damage caused by 
delayed reform is the same. The strong 
pro-reform coalition needed to push 
through extensive reforms has yet to 
cohere, and delay decreases the 
chances that it ever will.  As time 
passes without progress, pro-reform 
constituencies that once supported 
FFC leadership are apt to become 
increasingly frustrated and suspicious 
that their alliance partners have been 
co-opted, and peripheral groups will 
become increasingly skeptical of the 
motives and credibility of all Khartoum-
based actors. If these trends continue, 
the ultimate outcome  is either renewed 
kleptocracy or, more likely, a 
duplication of the first scenario 
described – rapid decay and absolute 
losses for all factions.  
 
This paper seeks to chart a way out of 
this trap by merging the authors’ 
respective practical experience of 
Sudan and of similar transitions in 
other states with comparative 
theoretical work examining the 
conditions and processes that have 
produced security sector reform or 
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failure in other transitional states. We find 
that the most promising avenue involves, 
first, all pro-reform forces investing or 
reinvesting time and effort into the 
consultative political work needed to keep 
their respective constituencies focused 
on and optimistic about prospects for 
reform. Further, these groups must act 
strategically to forge bonds between pro-
reform factions – sympathetic security 
forces and the FFC, the FFC and 
peripheral groups, etc. – that will prove 
durable if based on clearly-articulated 
shared goals and thickened ties below the 
level of senior leadership. Finally, these 
actors must ensure that the current 
transitional process maintains and 
reinforces these dynamics as it 
progresses. This process, if correctly 
structured to encourage joint problem-
solving rather than hasty fixes to complex 
challenges, to include mechanisms for 
popular input around everyday security 
and justice issues, and to avoid the 
entrenchment of unaccountable security 
and justice structures during the long 
transition to come, can do the work of 
maintaining popular pressure for reform 
and thus, momentum for change.  
 
To make this case, we first present the 
evidence that Sudan in the present 
moment (but not indefinitely) is a 
strong candidate for reform progress. 
We then summarize the recent 
histories, constituent parts, and 
interests of the primary factions 
currently engaged in transitional 
negotiations, simultaneously exploring 
moments of danger and opportunity as 
well as successful strategies for 
navigating both gleaned from the 
patterns of past cases. 
 
To conclude, we explore Sudan’s likely 
immediate, intermediate, and long term 
security and justice reform tasks. By 
examining the structure and agenda of 
the current Juba talks, we map out how 
pro-reform groups can in the near term 
joint force behind an SSR process 
agreement – including consensus as to 
primary reform objectives, the structure 
and responsibilities of a joint 
mechanism to direct SSR planning and 
implementation, and key timelines and 
benchmarks  - that simultaneously 
allows for a broadly consultative and 
inclusive process, ensures that 
immediate tasks undergird rather than 
undermine prospects for more 
sweeping reform, and maintains the 
momentum and popular support 
necessary for reform progress to move 
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forward and expand throughout the 
transitional period. 
Sudan’s Moment of 
Opportunity in 
Context  
As a rule, states that go on to achieve 
major security sector reform must, like 
Sudan, first suffer societal disruption 
significant enough to destroy the political 
status quo – the ruling coalition, 
whatever its component parts, breaks 
apart and losses the ability to act 
collectively. Before this point, no amount 
of external pressure for reform is likely to 
override an autocrat’s incentives to avoid 
it. To make the security forces 
accountable to the public they serve and 
significantly reduce corruption in 
acquisitions and promotions would 
alienate critical allies among security 
force leaders, to give up useful tools such 
as personally-controlled militias and 
intelligence services, and, especially 
dangerous in Sudan’s political 
marketplace context, to lose access to 
sources of the political finance (arms 
 
3 S Detzner, “Nothing For Us Without US?: The Impact of 
Popular Participation on Security Sector Reform Progress In 
Transitional States,” PhD diss., (Tufts University, 2019) 20-21 
deals, mercenary rents, etc.) they rely 
on to rent political support.3  
 
However, after the breakup of a ruling 
coalition, aspiring leaders must look for 
allies to form new coalitions. If there 
are sufficient constituencies – ordinary 
citizens, disaffected members of the 
security services, civil society, business 
interests, regional leaders in search of 
greater autonomy, etc. – that 
understand security and justice reform 
as in their interest, and, critically, if 
these constituencies are able to unite 
and collectively push for change before 
anti-reform forces can re-cohere, new 
leaders will be strongly incentivized to 
deliver on promises of reform, and 
security sector transformation 
becomes possible.4  
 
Pre-transition Sudan was a strong 
example of a political marketplace, and 
thus infertile ground for reform. A 
skilled political manager (al-Bashir) 
controlled most of the revenue from 
natural resource exports (at that point 
largely oil) and dolled them out to rent 
the loyalty of various other power 
players, mostly security force leaders.5 
4 Ibid. 
5 Alex de Waal, “Sudan: A political marketplace analysis,” 
WPF Occasional Paper 19, August 2019. 
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As the last few decades of Sudanese 
history demonstrates, this system was 
always somewhat unstable, as one of the 
best ways for an ambitious regional 
leader to gain more power was to rebel, 
wait to be paid off and promoted as part 
of a peace deal, and replicate this pattern 
with his own followers. Further, it was 
very much in al-Bashir’s interest to divide 
Sudan’s military into rival institutions as a 
coup-proofing mechanism. Over time, as 
generalized corruption and inefficient 
military-owned businesses proliferated, 
the revenue to be had from other sources, 
such as agriculture, general trade, or 
business taxes, dwindled.  Dependent on 
commodity-based pay-outs, this system 
could not survive the dramatic decrease 
in Sudan’s oil revenue after South Sudan’s 
independence. The alternative source of 
rent—gold—was neither sufficient in 
quantity nor under central control in a 
way that allowed the previous political 
marketplace arrangements to persist. 
  
Al-Bashir was ousted, largely through 
non-violent civil resistance, by what would 
come to be known as the Forces for 
Freedom and Change Alliance (FFC), a 




from Sudan’s professional class, state 
employees, and non-military business 
people pursuing their own interests in 
building a more stable and less corrupt 
Sudan that could nurture non-extractive 
industries and curb security force 
abuse and appropriation. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the immediate response 
of the security agencies to the fall of 
the former regime was to replace it 
with another military government in the 
name of transition. They formed a 
Transitional Military Council composed 
of the generals of Sudan Armed Forces 
(SAF), the National Intelligence and 
Security Service (NISS), and senior 
commanders of the Rapid Support 
Force (RSF). Leaders of the RSF, 
apparently the most resourced in terms 
of political finance, have attempted to 
approximate al-Bashir’s system of 
payoffs using revenue from gold sales 
and providing mercenary services to 
Gulf states. However, reconstructing 
the old alliance has proved difficult, as 
spoils to be dispensed are much 
reduced and many SAF generals both 
resent and mistrust the leaders of the 
RSF. Further, the weakened and divided 
Sustaining Momentum: Seizing the opportunity for SSR in Sudan  
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security forces’ violent yet unsuccessful 
attempts to suppress the FFC damaged 
their internal and external credibility 
considerably. 
 
Their solution was to negotiate for and 
ultimately form a new transitional 
government with the civilians of the FFC. 
The FFC found itself in a newly powerful 
but precarious position. Given the 
security forces’ entrenched position, 
joining them in a power-sharing alliance 
was one of the most straightforward (and 
possibly the only) ways to avoid further 
conflict in Khartoum. However, the 
agreement alienated the FFC’s other 
potential alliance partner, the loosely 
organized communities and armed 
groups on Sudan’s peripheries. This 
constituency had and has more in 
common with the FFC in terms of an 
intrinsic motivation to pursue reform 
generally and security/justice reforms in 
particular but lacked the internal cohesion 
necessary to commit to an agreement 
with the FFC in the near term.  
 
The FFC has tried to ameliorate this 
resentment and address these groups’ 
concerns that they will be shut out of the 
transitional process through the structure 
of current negotiations, but, given Sudan’s 
history of civilians and security forces 
from the center dominating and 
exploiting the peripheries, there is 
lingering distrust and deep suspicion 
that the FFC/security force alliance is a 
prelude to more of the same. At the 
same time, the FFC/security force 
partnership of necessity has never 
been a comfortable one, and further, 
divisions within all three major 
constituencies – the FFC, the security 
forces, and peripheral groups – 
threaten the ability of each to act 
decisively. 
 
In order to understand how these 
tensions are manifesting and could 
potentially be addressed in current 
negotiations, it is helpful to first 
examine the histories, interests, 
strengths, and weaknesses of each of 
these groups as well as to compare 
them to their rough equivalents in 
similar past cases of transition.  
 
1. The FFC and “Urban” Civil 
Society  
Civil society actors in major city 
centers, many of whom are members 
of the FFC or allied organizations, are 
the obvious linchpin of any pro-SSR 
coalition. While their recent victories 
Sustaining Momentum: Seizing the opportunity for SSR in Sudan  
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are impressive, their continued political 
power will depend on their on-going 
ability to act together.  
 
As Naimark-Rowse, Berridge and others 
have explored, in Sudan’s long history of 
civil resistance, pro-reform groups have 
been most successful when they have 
managed to stay united around a 
common reform agenda and build on 
existing social, familial, and other ties that 
bridge civilian protesters and the security 
forces.6 This strongly echoes Detzner’s 
findings from a variety of other cases, 
and the contrasts between successes 
and failures are illuminating.7  
 
In cases of SSR success, notably 
Indonesia and Peru, urban middle and 
upper-class pro-reform groups 
reminiscent of the FFC first entered into 
dialogues, and were eventually able to 
craft a shared reform agenda with, 
interest groups from peripheral areas 
representing much larger populations.8 
Further, these groups fostered similar 
lines of communication with members of 
 
6 Benjamin R. Naimark-Rowse. "Surviving Success: 
Nonviolent Rebellion in Sudan." Journal of Peacebuilding & 
Development 12, no. 3 (2017), 118 
Willow J. Berridge. Civil Uprisings in Modern Sudan: The 
‘Khartoum Springs' of 1964 and 1985. Bloomsbury 
Publishing (2015) 
Alex de Waal. “Don’t Shoot Us, Dad: Sudan’s Uprisings in 
the security forces, many of whom had 
an interest in maintaining or restoring 
the prestige and popularity of their 
institutions and were willing to agree to 
a retreat from politics in exchange for 
formalized protection from constant 
political interference, cronyism, etc.9  
 
In cases where SSR progress stalled, 
notably Kenya and Nepal, anti-reform 
political leaders were able to keep civil 
society groups divided, and thus 
ineffectual, by amplifying ethnic, 
religious, and regional divisions, usual 
through co-option.10 For example, in 
Kenya, the civil society coalition that 
helped bring down President Moi split 
post-transition as the new regime 
rewarded and recruited co-ethnics into 
government.11 In Burundi, armed 
groups negotiating various peace 
treaties assented to civil society 
involvement in these talks, but insisted 
that these actors could only take part 
as affiliates of ethnically-based political 
parties, once again keeping pro-reform 
forces effectively divided and politically 
Context.” Times Literary Supplement. (May 7, 2019) 
7 Detzner, “Nothing For Us Without US?” 164, 349-396 
8 Ibid, 230 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid, 370, 386 
11 Ibid, 374 




Unfortunately, this anti-reform tactic is 
more effective in states, like Sudan, 
where prolonged violence has left the 
population politically activated but highly 
polarized, often along ethnic/regional 
lines, and underdeveloped 
communication and transportation 
infrastructure, varied terrain, and limited 
literacy make forming strong 
intercommunal ties difficult.13  Further, in 
such cases, pro-reform civil society 
actors are often understandably 
concerned that they will be left 
unprotected if they go against the wishes 
of the armed group most closely 
associated with their community.  
 
The FFC in its early days was fairly well-
constructed to stay responsive to the 
interests and concerns of its primary 
supporters, an important prerequisite to 
both broader outreach work and the 
ability to credibly commit to joint 
positions, alliances, etc. The formal 
structure of a Central Council for higher 
level political decisions, a coordination 
council for day-to-day coordination, and 
an advisory council responsible for input 
to all on keeping actions focused on core 
 
12 Ibid, 281 
goals, with all three institutions 
including representatives from 
throughout the FFC’s various factions, 
was a well-designed architecture. 
However, the value of such a structure 
lies entirely in its continuous operation, 
which decreased significantly after the 
FFC alliance with security forces and 
the formation of the transitional 
government. This neglect was a major 
strategic mistake, especially for a 
relatively new organization like the FFC, 
which lacks a foundation of intra-
coalition trust and long-established 
working relationships between key 
members. Further, Sudan’s history as a 
political marketplace deepens the 
potential for distrust – all actors 
involved are very used to seeing 
political loyalty as a commodity that 
can be purchased on a short-term 
basis.  
 
However, the mistake is not 
irrecoverable. The example of South 
Africa’s African National Congress 
horizontal and vertical continuous 
consultations before, during, and after 
the negotiations for SSR, suggest that 
active consultation with FFC members 
at every level, both during negotiations 
13 Ibid, 111-114 
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and throughout the transitional period, 
will help the organization retain cohesion 
and legitimacy and thus, politically 
potency. The FFC should both revive its 
previous consultative mechanisms and 
orient these mechanisms specifically 
toward achieving strong internal 
consensus on key transitional issues 
such as the future role and limits of the 
military, the appropriate balance of local, 
provincial, and national government 
responsibilities, which justice reform 
goals should be prioritized, etc.  
Ideally, these consultations should 
produce clear and public position 
statements, which can then be the 
starting point for broader consultations 
with other interest groups. By having  
these consensus positions clearly 
articulated, the FFC would also be a 
stronger position to implement a 
communications strategy that allows it to 
articulate its identity and goals separate 
from its role in the transitional 
government, and thus to protect itself to 
an extent from being seen as co-opted by 
its security force governing partners.  
 
However, given the dangers of losing 
momentum, the proposed internal 
coalition strengthening must be done in 
 
14 De Waal. “Don’t Shoot Us, Dad” 
parallel with attempts to expand the 
coalition. It is obvious that FFC 
leadership must continue their current 
conversations, both during formal 
negotiations and elsewhere, with those 
security force and peripheral group 
leaders who share some of their reform 
priorities and with whom they may be 
able to find acceptable compromises 
on other issues. However, it is less 
obvious but also important that the 
FFC prioritize reaching out at the sub-
leadership level. As previously 
described, many rank-and-file security 
force members have much to gain 
from reform, and, importantly, they 
have business, social, and familial ties 
with many of the FFC’s core 
constituencies, especially students. As 
de Waal describes in “Don’t shoot us, 
Dad,” activating these ties has 
encouraged reform and limited 
violence several times in recent 
Sudanese history.14 The key may be to 
move beyond asking security force 
members merely to disobey repressive 
orders and onto actively encouraging 
them to organize and articulate their 
own specific interests. Notably, in 
several cases of lasting security sector 
Sustaining Momentum: Seizing the opportunity for SSR in Sudan  
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reform (Peru and South Africa) the 
formation of police and/or military unions 
has seemingly helped anchor reform.15 
 
Interests & Priorities 
In order to understand both the interests 
of FFC affiliates, the current relative 
power of this block, and the areas in 
which it most likely to find common 
ground with other factions, it is necessary 
to understand the changing economic 
role of its members. As revenues from oil 
and gold dwindle, the power of 
businesspeople and professionals – the 
FFC’s core constituency - who make 
more sustainable contributions to the 
Sudanese economy grows. De Waal 
notes “not all Sudanese capitalism is of 
the crony variety” and business people 
and professionals from Khartoum and 
surrounding areas that fueled the FFC are 
strongly incentivized to see Sudan 
become more attractive to international 
investment and less economically 
dependent on commodities (most 
recently gold) that can be monopolized by 
the state.16 In numerous other cases of 
 
15 Detzner, “Nothing For Us Without US?” 408 
16 De Waal. “Sudan: A Political Marketplace Framework 
Analysis,” Occasional Paper No. 19. Conflict Research 
Programme/World Peace Foundation, (August 2019) 2 
17 Detzner, “Nothing for Us Without Us?” 230 
18 Paul Strey. "Rule of Law in Law’s Absence: Examining the 
SSR progress (notably Indonesia, Peru, 
and South Africa) the business and 
professional classes have driven 
justice reform and promoted strong 
anti-corruption institutions.17  
 
There is evidence from recent decades 
that legislative reform addressing 
dispute resolution mechanisms related 
to foreign investments has the 
potential to jump-start the Sudanese 
economy and thus help break the 
state’s dependence on oil, gold, and 
mercenary wages. Strey notes that in 
1999 and 2005, Bashir’s introduction of 
laws that partially protected 
international investors from being 
extorted within the executive-controlled 
judicial system by ensuring disputes 
would be handled by independent 
arbitration corresponded with a 
significant increase in foreign direct 
investment and economic growth.18 
There is potential for the Sudanese 
agricultural sector, for example, to be 
significantly more profitable if 
corruption can be curtailed.19 In the 
past, Gulf investors in agriculture have 
Legal Politics of Sudan." Social Science Journal (2017): 1. 
19 De Waal. “Sudan: A Political Marketplace Framework 
Analysis,” Occasional Paper No. 19. Conflict Research 
Programme/World Peace Foundation, (August 2019) 16 
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either withdrawn or have failed to follow 
through on land leases because of the 
costs of corrupt payments and the social 
unrest associated with corrupt land 
development.20 A reform program aimed 
at fostering a more appealing investment 
environment would be hugely facilitated 
by the U.S. lifting sanctions (by removing 
Sudan from the list of state sponsors of 
terror), or, at the least, establishing clear 
and predictable conditions for these 
sanctions to be lifted.  
 
Further, judicial reform backed by this 
class might offer those political/military 
elites currently using bargaining via 
violence within the political marketplace a 
way to safely accept the proverbial 
smaller piece of a larger (and more 
sustainable) pie that economic growth 
potentially creates. Precedents for this 
shift include Mexico and Senegal, where 
ruling oligarchies, facing the loss of 
power, chose to back the creation of an 
independent judiciary before their 
withdrawal so as to prevent rivals from 
using state power to target them and 
their assets.21  
 
 
20 Daniel Stoll, “Qatar’s Food and Water Security: An evolving 
strategy,” in Rogaia Abusharaf and Dale Eickelman (eds.), 
Africa and the Gulf Region: Blurred boundaries and shifting 
ties, Berlin, Gerlach, 2015. 
Notably, across many cases of SSR 
progress, judicial reform of this kind 
came before or concurrently with DDR, 
police, and military reform, and served 
to anchor other reforms by making 
them more difficult for the executive to 
reverse.22 In instances where the new 
executive was left unconstrained, such 
as Burundi and (to a lesser extent) 
Kenya, SSR gains were transitory.23 
 
2. The Security Services  	
Sudan has never, since independence, 
had properly professionalized security 
institutions. The political independence 
of the Sudanese Defence Forces was 
undermined first by a series of coups 
and then in the 1980s by the 
establishment of military economic 
corporations, which drew officers into 
business dealings. When civil war 
broke out in 1983, the government 
relied on militia for much of the fighting 
but used army officers for coordination, 
drawing them into the militia economy 
of pillage. 
 
In 1989, the National Islamic Front 
21 Detzner, “Nothing for Us Without Us?” 409 
22 Ibid, 14 
23 Ibid, 279, 349 
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(NIF) seized power in a coup and 
embarked on sweeping and 
unprecedented changes to the 
organization and military doctrine of the 
Sudanese army. To prevent future 
security service coups, the regime first 
acted to divide them much as possible. 
Firstly, it consolidated and strengthened 
the powers of NISS (National Intelligence 
Security Services) as a rival and check on 
the SAF. At the same time, it established 
Islamist paramilitaries and created the 
Popular Defense Forces (PDF), 
exclusively run by Islamists.  In the 
process hundreds of top-and middle-rank 
officers were laid off, seriously 
downgrading military professionalization. 
The mission of the army was redefined as 
defending the Islamic regime rather than 
the nation. Counter-insurgency was 
redefined as fighting anti-Islamic forces 
and jihad became the rallying cry for 
jihadists to join the PDF seeking victory or 
martyrdom.  
 
At the same time the regime acted to 
mollify the remaining SAF and the other 
security institutions by allowing them to 
engage in economic activities on 
privileged terms. Security force 
 
24 Atta El-Battahani, “The Sudan Armed Forces and 
Prospects of Change,” CMI Insight. April, 2016 
involvement now pervades and 
corrupts both the forces themselves 
and the broader Sudanese economy – 
the military is involved in 
manufacturing, services, the 
automotive industry, pharmaceuticals, 
running airports, and even such 
marketing and selling furniture.24  
 
Highlighting the unpredictability of this 
system, one of the militias the regime 
developed in order to circumvent the 
existing security forces has since 
become an important player in its own 
right. In the 2000s, following the split in 
the Islamist ranks, the regime fought 
the Darfur counterinsurgency by 
mobilizing Arab militia. Popularly 
known as Janjaweed, these militias 
were later formalized as Border 
Intelligence Forces (“Border Guards”). 
One brigade of the Border Guards was 
subsequently renamed the Rapid 
Support Forces and massively 
expanded. The RSF took over control 
gold production and trading, which in 
turn enabled its leaders’ access much 
needed political capital, especially as 
rents from oil declined. Its control over 
disarmament campaigns in Darfur also 
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helped it accumulate more weapons and 
vehicles and take control over key 
checkpoints and smuggling routes. This 
left the RSF a formidable and parallel 
force to the SAF, with its own parallel 
command.  
 
This overall trajectory also describes the 
degeneration of the Sudanese Police 
Service as a professional force. At the 
ascent of the NIF to power, professional 
police officers were continuously purged 
and replaced by cadres of the regime. 
Furthermore, the institution was 
increasingly pushed into a militarized 
form of policing, mostly deployed to 
enforce local administrative orders rather 
than protect citizens. In the position of 
having to serve many political masters 
simultaneously, the Sudanese Police 
Force has long sought to protect itself as 
an institution by resisting decentralization 
and building “a stronger and central 
police institution capable of encountering 
and absorbing the significant and 
frequent political changes at the center of 
the state.”25 The result of this was “an 
implicit agreement between the military 
officers in power and the police 
headquarters…in which the police would 
 
25 Ammar Mohamed Elbaghir Ibrahim “The Police of the 
Sudan:  Challenges of Centralization and Militarization,”  
act as reserve in the military operations 
in Southern Sudan, in exchange for the 
regime’s preserving the unity of the 
police force and strengthening the 
central mode of administration.26” In 
the wake of South Sudan’s 
independence, followed by the regime’s 
decline and fall, the police find 
themselves in a precarious position in 
the urban centers where they normally 
operate, with their institutional 
reputation further damaged by the 
transitional military government’s use 
of their forces to attack protestors. 
Even before the transition, police 
presence outside these centers, in 
Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and 
Sudan’s peripheries in general, has long 
been weak to non-existent.  
 
Interests & Priorities 
This brief narrative helps demonstrate 
the ways in which, over time, Sudan’s 
previous system of government 
delivered fewer benefits and greater 
risk even to those who, charged with 
protecting it, might reasonably have 
expected to be best rewarded. Despite 
the privileges and compensation, life as 
The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles. (V1:3, 
2017) 277 
26 Ibid.  
Sustaining Momentum: Seizing the opportunity for SSR in Sudan  
 16 
a soldier or policeman in Sudan, 
especially for officers, is precarious. Even 
before the recent upheaval, past 
experience suggests that a government 
purge could come at any time, 
advancement to key roles is often based 
on political connection and bribes, and 
rival units may find themselves fighting 
one another.  
 
This raises the strong possibility that 
ordinary members of the security 
services might well be persuaded to back 
a reform agenda, even one that 
significantly curtails their privilege, in 
exchange for the opportunity to regain a 
place of general respect within Sudanese 
society (as happened post-transition in 
Sierra Leone, Burundi, and South Africa) 
and break out of system in which political 
influence/corruption is the only path to 
career advancement.27  Perhaps the 
greatest challenge, especially amidst a 
general economic crunch, will be 
persuading the military to give up its 
economic privileges. Unfortunately, 
establishing a level playing field for 
business in Sudan is also critical to 
renewed prosperity, and thus for the 
survival of any new regime.  
 
 
27 Detzner, “Nothing for Us Without Us?” 
However, there is some room for 
compromise as well as for effective 
international intervention. Intensive and 
prolonged international support for 
military reform (as opposed to one-
time DDR packages), as were offered in 
Burundi and Sierra Leone, could serve 
two key purposes:  
 
1) Offering access to high-quality 
training and education with the goal 
of eventually qualification for 
involvement in AU/UN peacekeeping 
operations can address the desire 
both for renewed 
respectability/prestige and to replace 
lost revenue, as such posting are 
usually comparatively lucrative, 
 
2) Subsidizing the new regime to offer to 
appropriate and reliable salaries, 
benefits, and basic equipment to 
security force members, increasing in 
stages as military involvement in the 
economy is phased out. Previously, 
compensation was kept artificially 
low on the grounds that troops could 
self-fund through business enterprise. 
Such subsidizes are a temporary 
measure, but buy time for market 
reform and anti-corruption measures 
to yield economic dividends allowing 
security forces to shrink (due to 
increased availability of other 
attractive jobs) and government 
revenue (including from reduced 
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corruption in defense procurement) to 
grow sufficiently to support the 
remainder.  
 
Security service elites have more to lose, 
but also are also more likely to have first-
hand knowledge that the old status quo, if 
it can be reconstructed at all, will only be 
pieced back together after extensive and 
costly infighting.  As elites, senior leaders 
of the security institutions are in greater 
danger from their rivals should the 
Sudanese transition devolve into a direct 
struggle between security force factions.  
Experience from Indonesia and Peru’s 
successful transitions (in which large 
factions of military elites backed 
reformers over autocrats) suggests that 
these elites can be persuaded not to 
block, and may actively back, security 
reform if they can thereby protect some 
of their core interests.28 
 
Some of these are financial – the recent 
decision by the transitional government 
to confiscate property and plots of land 
amounting to 92,000 square meters from 
ousted leader al-Bashir’s extended family 
(and his close ally and former Minister of 
Defense) as well as the dissolution of 
 
28 De Waal. “Sudan: A Political Marketplace Framework 
Analysis,” Occasional Paper No. 19. Conflict Research 
Programme/World Peace Foundation, August 2019, 2 
Detzner, “Nothing for Us Without Us?” 270 
board of directors of the Khartoum 
International Airport Company and the 
Sudan Airports Holding Company 
underlines that the current unsettled 
political situation carries real risks to 
military elites.29  
 
Further, the transitional government’s 
decision to turn al-Bashir over the 
International Criminal Court 
incentivizes these elites to bargain for 
an amnesty for past human rights 
abuses while they still have the 
leverage to do so. Allowing military 
elites to keep some ill-gotten gains and 
escape prosecution for extensive past 
crimes is far from an attractive 
proposition. However, compromises 
such as truth and reconciliation 
mechanisms and limited asset 
reclamation arrangements have 
allowed other states in transition to 
strike and uneasy but workable balance 
between demanding accountability and 
avoiding incentivizing outgoing regime 




29 “Sudanese corruption committee confiscates Bashir 
family properties” KFGO, May 7, 2020. 
https://kfgo.com/2020/05/07/sudanese-corruption-
committee-confiscates-bashir-family-properties/ 
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3. Peripheral Communities & 
Armed Groups 	
Sudan’s peripheries are united in distrust 
of the center, but not necessarily on many 
other points, including the need for 
comprehensive security sector reform. 
The armed groups located in various 
parts of Sudan’s periphery have long been 
thoroughly embedded within the political 
marketplace and are used to operating 
within its rules.30 De Waal observes of the 
negotiations around the 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the 
Darfur peace talks of 2003-2011, and the 
post-referendum arrangements of 2011, 
that rather than any genuine interest in 
DDR or SSR, “For the rebels, the concern 
was finding the material means for them 
to consolidate their respective 
movements so as to operate more 
effectively on the battlefield and in 
political processes.”31 However, he 
follows this by noting that: 
 
“The demand for SSR came from 
elsewhere; from the people... Only on 
one occasion was this demand 
articulated cogently in a forum that 
enjoyed political influence. This was 
the series of public consultations held 
 
30 De Waal. “Sudan: A Political Marketplace Framework 
Analysis,” Occasional Paper No. 19. Conflict Research 
Programme/World Peace Foundation, August 2019 
by the AU High-Level Panel on 
Darfur (AUPD)… It travelled to Darfur 
and over a period of approximately 
40 days held a series of public 
hearings in the major towns, in the 
camps of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) and in rebel-held 
areas. Participants in these 
meetings demanded their own 
representation in any political 
process that determined the future 
of Darfur. They recognized the 
existence of the diverse armed 
groups – whose members were 
their own sons and brothers – and 
sought a mechanism for making 
these groups accountable and 
subject to community control. Their 
starting point was not security in the 
sense of the security sector, but in 
the sense of the security to which 
ordinary people should be 
entitled.”32 	
This observation points to the potential 
for change at the community level. The 
loss of centrally-controlled oil revenue 
has forced leaders in Khartoum to 
either respond to the demands of 
constituents who control the resources 
they will have to rely on going forward 
(taxes from business, agriculture, etc.) 
or be removed. Similarly, armed group 
leaders have lost access to the rents 
they received from Khartoum either as 
31 Alex de Waal. "Peace and the security sector in Sudan, 
2002–11." African Security Review 26, no. 2 (2017), 192 
32 Ibid. 
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militias for the regime or in exchange 
(though fleeting peace processes) for 
temporary ceasefires. To survive and 
maintain their authority, they must 
receive support from the communities 
they claim to represent or find another 
way to replace lost revenue. Few of these 
groups are completely untethered from 
their communities of origin. Whether 
deepen these ties by acting as (or in 
some cases continuing to be) a protective 
force or turn instead to raiding, looting 
and mercenary work will depend in large 
part on civilian community leaders’ 1) 
ability to paint a plausible picture of a 
more a prosperous future enabled by 
decreased violence, and 2) ability to pool 
their leverage, coordinate, and set a 
collective agenda and standards of 
conduct within each region. Such shared 
agendas would also facilitate 
negotiations between the FFC and the 
regions (and between regions) by 
reducing the complexity of negotiations 
and clarifying each interest group’s key 
priorities.  
 
The Juba peace talks (between the 
transitional government and the 
peripheries and their armed groups 
(including the SPLM/A-North, the SLA, 
and the Justice and Equality Movement) 
are encouraging in that armed groups 
have, seemingly in response to 
community demand, shown a greater 
level of interest in how security and 
justice services will be structured post-
transition. While some groups are 
following past pattern by primarily 
seeking resources for in-group 
consolidation and local dominance, 
many of them are increasingly showing 
concern and interest in the 
restructuring and reforming of the 
security sector at the national level. To 
maintain this interest, any transitional 
SSR process will have to answer the 
question of what security force 
accountability and access to justice 
looks like at the regional as well as 
national level. In Sudan, given that 
policing by a centralized force is, in the 
peripheries, logistically and financially 
impossible, many citizens already rely 
on chiefs, customary authorities, or 
armed groups for these services 
informally. However, a reformed and 
formalized system will need to ensure 
that chiefs (or other selected leaders) 
are accountable to (and removable by) 
their own constituents, rather than the 
central government.  
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Negotiations: 
Structure and SSR 
Agenda 
If the components to create a successful 
pro-security reform coalition exist in 
Sudan, the forum for such a coalition to 
come together and exert common 
pressure at a key point already exists. 
This section will discuss how current 
negotiations have progressed, the key 
immediate and long term security and 
justice issues they will have to resolve, 
and how the on-going transitional 
negotiation process might be structured 
to encourage durable solutions to these 
issues based on the real needs of the 
population at large. 
 
After the fall of the previous regime and 
the successful popular protests against a 
purely military transitional government, 
Sudan’s key players agreed, in August 
2019, to a Constitutional Declaration 
which contained a formula for civilian-
military cohabitation for a three-and-a-
half year transition period. This 
Declaration serves as the constitution for 
a transitional period during which a 
permanent settlement is to be negotiated, 
and outlines the key activities of the 
transitional period, modalities for their 
implementation, and a basic timeline.  
 
As previously mentioned, the alliance 
between the FFC and the security 
forces to form a transitional 
government was perceived by the 
peripheral armed groups that the FFC 
was simultaneously negotiating with as 
something of a betrayal. The new 
transitional government, aware these 
groups would understandably refuse to 
recognize any new constitution they 
had no role in shaping, agreed in 
October to the Juba Declaration of 
Peace, which outlined a negotiation 
and transition process that would allow 
for the input of all major actors.  Ideally, 
this model, which stipulates that the 
final agreement will supersede all 
previous agreements, allows for the 
gradual inclusion of and increasing 
number of factions and peripheral 
groups as negotiations progress, 
reducing the chances that such groups 
will reject the final outcome as having 
been formed without their input and 
failing to address their interests. It is an 
important break from the “back room 
deal” structure of previous (and short-
lived) agreements in past Sudanese 




While the Juba Declaration originally set a 
six month deadline for conclusion of the 
next round of talks and a further 
agreement, this deadline has been 
extended into May of 2020 and has now 
reverted to indirect talks with an open 
ended time due to the global impact of 
COVID-19 crisis, among other factors. 
The larger transitional timeline calls for 
the drafting and ratification of a 
constitution in three years (which will 
likely mean for four to five in practice), 
followed by democratic elections.  
 
As mentioned, the current talks break 
from past practice (both in Sudan and 
other unsuccessful SSR efforts) in that 
they are intended to produce an 
agreement over the process through 
which further, specific agreements will be 
negotiated, rather than attempting to 
resolve all outstanding issues in the short 
term. Nine months in, talks are 
progressing with varying levels of 
progress in varying regions.  
 
Promisingly, the talks are being hosted in 
Juba by the South Sudanese government. 
 
33 Yasir Arman, “Peace in Sudan and its effects on the 
Stability of South Sudan,” Seminar Paper. February 15, 2020 
This development indicates a 
consensus among elites in both 
Sudans that the two states will have to 
collaborate more closely if either is to 
have a chance at lasting stability and, 
as importantly, that peace on both 
sides of the shared border could bring 
desperately needed mutual 
opportunities for trade and economic 
development.33 It is certainly an 
encouraging break with past practice, 
in which leaders on both sides of the 
border regularly worked to destabilize 
one another by supporting rebel groups 
in one another’s territory. Further, the 
relationship appears reciprocal – South 
Sudan’s current assistance to Sudan’s 
transitional talks echoes the facilitator 
role that Sudan’s Transitional 
Government has recently played in 
talks between South Sudan’s major 
political players (Salva Kiir and Riek 
Machar) aimed at reactivating their 
own peace and transition process. 
 
Agreeing on a Transitional SSR 
Agenda & Path Forward 
So far, the talks have covered a range 
of region-specific interests. Regarding 
security sector reform, they have 
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produced a framework agreement with 
the two-areas with provisions aimed at 
increasing the democratic  accountability 
of the Sudan’s security institutions, 
provisions that could potentially serve as 
the  basis for a new national security 
strategy and related military doctrine.	34   
 
However, these early results are nowhere 
near a consensus as to the scope of 
security and justice reform to be 
considered, let alone the process though 
which it will be agreed. Negotiators face 
both immediate and long term tasks. This 
piece will attempt to articulate these 
tasks and further propose options for 
further negotiations whereby efforts to 
resolve the most pressing security issues, 
such as DDR,  can be structured so as to 
prepare the ground and produce 
important information for the resolution 
of longer term questions, such as which 
security forces (at what level of 
government) will be responsible (and to 
whom) for providing different types and 
levels of security services. 
 
Based on Sudan’s particular challenges 
 
34 Some of the provisions in the framework agreement 
include: A call to SAF for its loyalty to be to the country and 
its interests; the need for SAF’s composition to reflect 
Sudanese diversity; A call for NISS to be professional and 
composed of members reflecting Sudanese diversity. The 
framework also stipulates that NISS must be answerable to 
and the experience of other similarly 
situated states, the ultimate objectives 
of the transitional process regarding 
security and justice will need to include, 
at a minimum:  
 
• Reestablishing all Sudanese 
security forces with doctrines 
enshrining secularism, 
professionalism, and the 
supremacy of civilian authority;  
• Removing all security forces from 
direct roles in the economy while 
establishing an alternate and 
sustainable means of funding 
these forces at an agreed-upon 
size and capability level; 
• Ensuring that security forces have 
clearly defined, complementary, 
and non-overlapping 
responsibilities; 
• Reestablishing an independent 
judiciary and, more specifically, 
mechanisms through which the 
security forces can be 
accountable to civilian authority; 
and 
• Agreeing and codifying clear lines 
of authority and responsibility for 
service provision between highly 
local security and justice 
the national interests of the country and not to particular 
political parties, individuals, specific geographical areas, 
or other groups.  
 
 
Sustaining Momentum: Seizing the opportunity for SSR in Sudan  
 23 
providers, the national police, the 
military, and other applicable 
institutions. 
 
To maintain a relatively peaceful and 
conducive security environment in Sudan 
as the parties negotiate the path toward 
and boundaries of these objectives, the 
parties must more immediately achieve: 
 
• Consensus as the to the nature of 
the key security reform tasks (which 
will likely include issues beyond 
those listed above) that must be 
completed during the transition; 
• A complete agreement for a 
ceasefire as well as the 
disengagement, and redeployment 
of forces;  
• Official agreement over who, in 
which areas, will have transitional 
responsibility for providing security 
and justice services as well as who 
(external or internal) will be 
responsible for monitoring and 
verifying interim disarmament and 
other security arrangements; and 
• Agreement, with accompanying 
timeline and milestones, for the 
process by which these issues will 
be negotiated – who will be included, 
how will input be incorporated, how 
will the parties work together to 
resolve inevitable emergent issues 
and crises (lack of such a responsive 
mechanism having derailed many 
past efforts).  
 
A major point of concern is the criteria 
for inclusion in the talks. Planning a 
meaningful and lasting SSR process in 
Sudan will require massive 
consultation of a wide variety of 
stakeholders to break the past cycle of 
a rapid and exclusive peace agreement 
being followed by rebellion of excluded 
stakeholders, followed by yet another 
hasty peace agreement excluding other 
stakeholders,  etc., in a pattern 
conditioning all involved to rely on 
violence as a bargaining tactic. 
Encouragingly, representation in the 
current process has not been limited to 
armed groups. However, neither has 
participation been systematically 
structured to ensure that: 1) groups at 
the table truly represent the 
constituencies they claim to speak for, 
and 2) categories that are frequently 
marginalized, notably women, have a 
path to meaningfully participate. 
Without such participation, there is the 
danger that talks will degenerate into a 
division of spoils between the already 
powerful.  
 
In tension with this requirement is the 
need to move forward and maintain 
momentum in the transitional process 
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– other transitions with as-or-more 
promising begins (Kenya, Nepal, 
Guatemala) have floundered in the past 
when anti-reform forces have success 
stalled stalling on key issues, such as 
DDR, and/or pushed for overly baroque 
and extended implementation plans that 
facilitate yet further delays. Such stalling 
tends to erode popular faith in the 
process (and allows time to implement 
ethnic/regional polarization strategies) 
and complex implementation processes 
not well understood by the public allow 
recalcitrant actors to avoid accountability 
for failing to follow through on their 
commitments. Critically, SSR progress 
seems to take place either in the first five 
years post-transition, or not at all.35  
 
We propose that the best solution for 
Sudan to resolve this tension and address 
both short and long term security reform 
tasks is the creation of a joint institutional 
mechanism specifically empowered, 
throughout the transitional process, to 
examine in-depth, receive input regarding,  
and propose detailed solutions to, the 
security and justice issues previously 
detailed and oversee the implementation 
of designed programs during the 
 
35 Detzner, “Nothing for Us Without Us?” 16 
36 “El Salvador: Acuerdo de Nueva York,” Envio. (Oct. 1991) 
transition and even after where the 
need arises. One successful model for 
this is El Salvador’s post-civil war 
National Commission for the 
Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ). 
COPAZ, which was made up 
representatives from key rebel groups, 
the security forces of the deposed 
regime, and (importantly) other 
important societal constituencies, was 
tasked with: 
 
• Settling security related disputes 
(over DDR, ceasefire breaches, 
etc.) between the parties in El 
Salvador’s (complex and 
prolonged) transitional process;  
• Developing, with targeted 
assistance from the UN and other 
externals, the technical capacity to 
draft the implemented legislation 
for agreements reached (with the 
power to enact remaining with the 
parties); 
• Jointly inspecting and supervising 
the implementation of security-
related agreement provisions; and 
• Releasing periodic public reports, 
including recommendations, 
regarding reform progress.36  
 
Sudan could develop a similar 
https://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/689  
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mechanism with context-appropriate 
variations. Such a mechanism 
(answerable to the Supreme council and 
composed of representatives of the 
political parties, civil society, the security 
institutions, the rebel forces) might tackle 
the following key transitional tasks: 
 
• Conducting a complete security 
needs assessment throughout the 
country, followed by an assessment 
of the current state of Sudan’s 
security institutions, with the aim of 
the pairing the two analyses to 
identify gaps and institution reform 
priorities; 
• Drafting a detailed plan to gradually 
remove the security forces from their 
role in Sudan’s economy and transfer 
military-run enterprises back to 
private or state ownership; 
• Developing the plan and process for 
integrating former combatants into 
existing security institutions 
equitably and then right-sizing these 
institutions without either creating 
conflict or losing key expertise; 
• Developing, based on the probable 
structure and boundaries of the 
reformed security forces post-
ratification, a national security 
strategy and a new military doctrine 
for the army in line with said 
strategy; and  
• Agreeing upon and implementing an 
inclusive and public process that will 
produce the provisions related to 
security institutions to be ratified 
in post-transition constitution. 
 
Notably, the proposed tasks build upon 
on one another, thus maintaining 
momentum and allowing for growing 
trust and familiarity between parties.  
 
Throughout, popular consultation, 
inclusion, and transparency must be 
treated as key elements of proposed 
mechanism’s tasks, not optional extras 
to be cut if time or resources are 
strained.  Popular consultation is most 
effective, as South Africa’s experience 
highlights, if it occurs continuously 
throughout a reform process. Sudan 
has a very promising domestic 
precedent and model for such 
consultations – the recent Darfur 
Internal Dialogue and Consultations 
process. Especially with support from 
external donors, members of the 
proposed joint mechanism can oversee 
and implement this basic model across 
Sudan’s regions, taking advantage of 
the fact that such consultations (if their 
results are publicized) tend to build and 
maintain popular support for reform as 
well as uncovering the key needs of 
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each locality.37  
 
Everyday Security 
A more limited but rapid form of local 
consultations may further help to resolve 
more immediate transitional security 
issues. First, there is the critical but oft-
overlooked question of who will provide 
local, everyday security and justice 
services in Sudan during the prolonged 
transitional period.  
 
Sudan’s combination of poor 
infrastructure, low literacy, challenging 
terrain, and widely dispersed populations 
make it extremely difficult to police by 
conventional means, even before 
factoring in impact of years of violence 
and neglect on peripheral regions. 
Whatever the desires of Sudan’s official 
police, they simply do not have the 
resources (both during the transitional 
period and into the foreseeable future) to 
provide services throughout the country. 
At the same time, leaving such services 
to whichever local armed group chooses 
to provide them, without requiring such 
groups to demonstrate that the 
communities in question welcome their 
presence, entrenches both the armed 
 
37 Madeline England and Alex Boucher. "Security Sector 
Reform: Thematic Literature Review on Best Practices and 
groups themselves and destructive 
concept that security forces gain the 
right to operate through strength of 
arms rather than local legitimacy and 
accountability.  
 
A promising possible solution that lays 
the groundwork for future 
arrangements is for each locality in 
Sudan to, after a brief consultation 
process, present their preferred plan 
(ideally for approval by the parties 
through the joint mechanism) for the 
structure of local security and justice 
provision in their area during the 
transitional period. Local preferences in 
Sudan are likely to vary from region to 
region, villages to towns, nomads to 
farmers, etc. Many urban areas will 
likely continue to depend on 
established police. However, the vast 
majority of what policing and justice 
services exist in peripheral regions are 
already provided by non-state actors – 
encouraging various communities to 
articulate what particular arrangements 
are best suited to their areas and thus 
improve on what already exists is far 
more realistic and achievable than 
other alternatives.  
Lessons Learned." Security Sector Reform in Stabilization 
Environments: A Note on Current Practice (2009): 1-33. 
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The argument for such an approach is 
bolstered by previous cases of post-
conflict SSR in similarly-situated states, 
where those that were sensitive the need 
for local accountability and variation 
(Sierra Leone) saw greater and more 
durable policing gains than states that 
attempt to reproduce a standard police 
reform template (Liberia).38 In a number 
of cases, most notably Sierra Leone, the 
solution has been for community leaders 
such as chiefs to formally assume 
responsibility for certain aspects of 
policing and justice – mediating and 
ruling on disputes below a certain value, 
organizing volunteers (or locals recruited 
and paid by the chief) to conduct patrols, 
imposing limited punishments for minor 
offenses, and sometimes monitoring 
border incursions and/or keeping track of 
arms within a community.39 Such 
arrangements are more successful when: 
 
1) The designated chief or local leader is 
locally chosen and thus removable if the 
community is unsatisfied with their 
 
38 Ibid, 204, 279 
Bruce Baker. "A policing partnership for post-war Africa? 
Lessons from Liberia and southern Sudan." Policing & 
Society 19, no. 4 (2009): 372-389. 
39 Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe . “The Ethiopian post-
transition security sector reform experience: building a 
national army from a revolutionary democratic army,” 
African Security Review, (26:2 2017), 161-179 
James Vincent. "A Village‐Up View of Sierra Leone's Civil War 
and Reconstruction: Multilayered and Networked 
performance. While this may or may 
not be feasible in Sudan, there must 
be some mechanism ensuring that 
leaders with this authority are 
incentivized to maintain a broad base 
of local support. In the several cases 
where they have been centrally 
appointed agents of the state, armed 
rebellion has frequently resulted, and 
in other cases the construction of 
dubiously “traditional” structures has 
been used to further exploit 
marginalize groups.40 
 
2) The division of labor between the 
official police and the agents of the 
designated local authority is clear, 
generally understood by the 
population, and preferably negotiated 
and formally codified.41  
 
3) The designated local authority has a 
local source of funds (usually tax 
revenue) that can be used to provide 
these services. In a number of cases, 
the balance of power between the 
local authority and police is 
maintained because said authority 
can choose to share or withhold 
Governance." IDS Research Reports 2012, no. 75 (2012). 
10 
40 Paul Jackson. "Decentralised power and traditional 
authorities: How power determines access to justice in 
Sierra 
Leone." The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 
43, no. 63 (2011): 211 
Detzner, “Nothing for Us Without Us?” 366 
41 Ibid, 145 
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some of these funds from locally-
stationed police.42  
 
Such a rapid consultation also provides 
the opportunity to gather local input and 
preferences regarding the tricky problem 
of transitional DDR in Sudan. Given the 
distrust between the parties and the 
dangers of disbanding one’s forces, 
armed groups in Sudan may disagree to 
cantonment, especially given the current 
risk of Covid-19 in any such arrangement. 
However, armed group leaders (especially 
those struggling to materially provide for 
their troops) might well agree to an 
arrangement where each groups’ forces 
are counted and recorded, given basic 
screening screenings to discover their 
distributions of aptitudes, interests, 
qualifications, and post-war preferences 
for integration into the (possibly 
profoundly restructured) security 
agencies and/or reintegration into civilian 
life. After this basic screening, some of 
these troops might be directed to return 
to their communities of origin (an 
arrangement that may reassure armed 
group leaders that they are close enough 
to be remobilized if necessary) and slowly 
reintegrate into community life. Such a 
process is vastly more likely to succeed if 
 
42 Ibid, 271 
ex-combatants are returned to the 
communities of their origin and the 
communities are consulted on re-
integration programs and reintegration 
packages for returning combatants. 
Such a participatory approach will not 
only address the question of equity by 
the communities but also motivate 
them participate in assisting the 
returnees for a faster reintegration and 
increase the likelihood of success for 
the program.  
 
External Support 
Clearly, both the proposed DDR 
process and other suggested 
approaches will be much more feasible 
with external support. While this piece 
is not primarily aimed at external 
actors, it is worth briefly articulating the 
forms of external support that are likely 
to be most helpful in Sudan’s transition: 
 
In the immediate future, donors can 
best assist by: 
 
• Providing any targeted security 
guarantees necessary to maintain 
a ceasefire, 
• Providing resources and technical 
assistance to conduct the 
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proposed DDR census and partial 
reintegration processes; 
• Providing advice and technical 
assistance as negotiating parties 
establish an independent joint 
mechanism to oversee further steps 
in the SSR process; 
• Provide logistical support for forums 
within the various regions to help 
local leaders discuss and develop 
feasible plans for transitional local 
policing, justice, and security 
arrangements.  
 
During the transitional period, once a 
mechanism for longer term reform is 
established, donors should:  
 
• Help ensure transparency and build 
support	for the on-going reform 
process and interim agreements by 
providing resources to publicize 
them. 
• Providing logistical support for pro-
reform forces, especially from 
disparate interest groups and 
different regions, to meet with one 
another to discuss reform priorities, 
develop common positions, etc. In 
particular, security force members 
should be included wherever 
possible to incorporate their 
perspectives and increase their 
confidence in the potential value of 
reform. 
• Provide extensive technical support 
to the members of whatever 
mechanism is established to 
explore reform alternatives, 
conduct outreach, and solicit 
feedback.  
 
Beginning immediately, but with the 
understanding that results will take 
consistent investment over a period of 
years, donors should: 
 
• Encourage and logistically support 
the quick implementation of those 
reforms that seem most likely to 
bring about lasting, difficult to 
reverse changes to the incentives 
of political and security actors – 
justice and anti-corruption efforts, 
tax reform, meaningful local 
control over security provision, 
oversight, and resources, etc.  
• Invest in developing the technical 
expertise and capacity of civil 
society groups around issues of 
security and justice (prioritizing 
those that are at least somewhat 
internally democratic, as well as 
those that continuously engage in 
public outreach, coalition-building 
activities, and dialogues with other 
groups) to empower these groups 
to play a meaningful on-going role 
in both the reform process and 
future security force oversight. 
Preparing platforms of security 
and justice reform policies for the 
2023 elections are likely to be a 
useful focal point for such groups.  
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• Give substance to pro-reform 
arguments about what a post-reform 
political and economic landscape 
could look like – for example, by 
promising assistance to future 
economic development projects 
contingent on the implementation of 
the specific judicial reforms and anti-
corruption measures prioritized by 
domestic activists. The key here is to 
coordinate domestic with 
international pressure and so diffuse 
the argument that reforms are being 
externally imposed. 
Conclusion  
Sudan is currently in a uniquely promising 
moment to achieve a real security sector 
transformation, both as outcome of and 
an anchor for the nation’s transition to 
democracy.  In this piece, we have 
described the window of opportunity 
created by the destruction of the previous 
status quo and the early successes of 
pro-reform forces in exploiting that 
opportunity. These successes were 
clearly tied to the FFC’s ability, bolstered 
by its consultative structure, to stay 
united in the face of disunity among 
those looking to reconstruct Sudan’s 
shattered kleptocracy. Further, we have 
described how progress toward reform 
has stalled as the FFC has neglected 
internal consensus building efforts and 
struggled to balance its pragmatic 
governing alliance with the security 
forces with its clear need to make 
common security-reform cause with 
Sudan’s peripheral communities and 
armed groups.  
 
We have explored both the histories 
and interests of Sudan’s major 
interests groups with the goal of 
illuminating what might motivate these 
groups to work together for reform, and 
shed light on how exactly such 
collaboration might work in practice by 
drawing from the experiences of 
similarly-situated transitional states 
that were successful in their coalition-
building efforts.  
 
Finally, we have applied these 
dynamics to the present moment by 
arguing that the current Juba peace 
talks must focus not on the direct 
resolution of key SSR issues, but first, 
on setting over-arching reform 
objectives and then on creating 
inclusive and credible processes and 
mechanisms that will gather the input 
and information necessary to craft 
widely acceptable means to achieve 
these objectives. In short, if pro-reform 
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actors build both intra-and-inter group 
consultation around issues of security 
and justice into Sudan’s transition 
process, they can ensure both that the 
pro-SSR coalition cannot easily be divided 
and weakened, and that popular demand 
for reform (and thus the political prize of 
popular support for those who deliver 
reform) remains potent. 	
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